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cost was not to exceed eight hundred dollars. With reference to the Oakwood Club decision, should the farmer fare better than the urbanite under this "rural" doctrine where he is afforded less leeway in dealing with
the problem?"6
CONCLUSION

Tort law generally is in need of serious re-examination and in certain
areas some measure of codification. The law cannot expect laymen to
regulate their lives by guide lines so elusive that lawyers and trial and
appellate judges differ as to the consequences imputable to a specific act.
Nor is the enormity of the task an acceptable excuse for inaction. Many
of the accepted fixtures of our legal system have grown out of experimentation, particularly at a state level.
The cases covered in this article have pointed up the need to refine
legal-medical terminology and the pitfalls of contributory negligence. In
the area of water rights unprecedented opportunities have been indicated
for the formation of dynamic policies in coping with the resource problems allied with our projected national growth. In all of these areas
there continues to be a need for progressive experimentation in tort law
which will provide practical as well as equitable solutions. This can
only be achieved through a sensitive interplay of forces; the mutual contributions of advocate and judge.
JUSTIN C. SMITH

TRADE REGULATION
The first Ohio Fair Trade Act was enacted in 1936.' Section four
of that law,2 as applied to a non-signer, was held invalid by the Ohio
Supreme Court in 1958.' The decision was based upon three grounds:
(1) that the legislation represented an unauthorized exercise of the police
power in a matter unrelated to the public safety, morals, or general
welfare, (2) that it delegated legislative power to private persons, and
(3) that it unconstitutionally denied the owner of property the right to
sell it on terms of his own choosing.
The Ohio legislature in 1959 enacted an elaborate trade practices
statute to replace the 1936 statute which had been substantially invalidated by the 1958 supreme court decision. This new statute4 has a
detailed purpose and policy statement in support of its authorization of
minimum resale price fixing by a proprietor or a person to whom he has
66.

See reference to "urban rule" and "rural rule' in case cited note 63 supra.
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granted the sole authority to establish minimum resale prices within the
state. It has a more sophisticated solution for the problem presented by
the non-signer. The term "contract" is so broadly defined that any
person who, "with notice that the proprietor has established a minimum
resale price for a commodity, accepts such commodity shall thereby have
entered into an agreement with such proprietor not to resell such commodity at less than the minimum prices stipulated therefor by such
proprietor."5 The authorized methods of giving actual notice are numerous,' including notice by letter, through advertising, and by a statement attached to the article, its container or dispenser. A person who
has actual notice of any applicable minimum resale price is charged with
notice that such a price is subject to change. It is lawful to establish
minimum resale prices by notice or by contract and equally lawful to
change them thereafter by written notice to any distributor who has
acquired the trade-mark or trade name commodity with notice of any
established minimum resale price.' The proprietor's resale pricing program may, at his option, extend to all levels of distribution; he may, by
contract or notice, require all distributors to observe this minimum resale
pricing program.' The statute declares it to be unlawful and an act of
unfair competition for any distributor, with notice that a proprietor has
established a stipulated minimum resale price for a commodity, to sell,
offer to sell, or advertise such a commodity for sale at a price lower than
the stipulated minimum resale price! Any person suffering or reasonably anticipating damage as a result of a violation may bring suit to enforce the statute. Damages as well as injunctive relief may be awarded,
and the successful plaintiff may recover the costs of suit, including reasonable attorney fees, regardless of whether monetary damages are established.' A distributor may, however, avoid the effect of these provisions
1. 116 Ohio taws Pr. 2, 185 (1936).
2. Id. at 186. OHIo REv. CODE § 1333.07, providing that any person who knowingly and
wilfully advertises, offers for sale or sells any commodity at less than the minimum price stipulated in any contract entered into under section 3 (OHIo REV.CODE § 1333.06), whether
a party to the contract or not, is engaged in unfair competition and unfair trade practices and
is liable to any person damaged thereby.
3. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 NB.2d 481
(1958). See also discussion in Equity section, p. 515 supap.
See recent decision comment
in 9 WEsT. Ras. L. Ruv. 509 (1958). It is interesting that the decision of the court of
appeals which was reversed by the supreme court was not reported until 1960. See Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 163 N.2d 404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
4. Omo REv. CODE 5 1333.27.
5. Omo REv. CODE 5 1333.28 (1).
6. OHIO REv. CODE 5 1333.30.
7. OHIo Ry. CODE 5 1333.29(A).
8. OHIo REv. CODE § 1333.29(B).
9. OHIO REv. CODE § 1333.32 (A).
10. OtnO REV. CODE § 1333.32(B).
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if, after receiving notice that a minimum resale price has been established,
he removes all trace of the identifying trade-mark or trade name. The
proprietor retains a statutory proprietary interest in a commodity so long
as it continues to be identified by his trade-mark or trade name."
The constitutionality of this 1959 statute was raised in at least three
reported cases during 1960. Two of these were suits in the Common
Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. The third action was brought in the
Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County. The Cuyahoga County
cases were heard separately but decided and reported together. The
same plaintiff in both suits sought a declaratory judgment against the
constitutionality of the new statute. The defendants sought by cross
petitions, to enjoin the plaintiff from selling their respective products
at less than the fair trade price.'
The opinion of the trial judge questions whether the new legislation
cured the defects in the former "non-signer" section which had been held
unconstitutional. It compared the provisions of the old and the new
and concluded that the new statute did not correct the infirmity of the
old, particularly on the matter of delegation of legislative authority to a
private person. Having determined that this infirmity existed in the new
statute, the court relied upon the supreme court's decision in Union Car3 and declined
bide & Carbon Corporationv. BargainFair, Incorporated,"
to discuss any of the other questions of constitutionality raised in the
briefs.' 4 Eli Lilly & Company has appealed from this adverse decision.' 5
In the Hamilton County suit a manufacturer sought injunctive relief
under the new Fair Trade Law'" against a local distributor. The decision
was upon a demurrer to the petition, raising the question of constitutionality. The trial judge concluded that the new statute had all of the
defects of the old law and found that some additional restrictions upon
individual property owners were also unlawful and unconstitutional. In
holding the entire 1959 statute unconstitutional, the trial court found
11.
12.

OHIo REv. CODE § 1333.31.
Hudson Dist., Inc. v. Upjohn Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) 1 69,778

(Ohio C.P. July 28, 1960).
13. 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958).
14. While the court felt bound by the Union Carbide case, it noted additional support for
its position in a number of other jurisdictions which have held that similar statutes establishing the right to set a minimum price without reference to any standard unlawfully delegate
legislative power (recognizing that there is substantial federal and state authority contrary to
its position). Some of the cases on which it relies are: Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v.
Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956); Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane, 237 Ind.
188, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957); Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 182 Kan.
488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958); and Remington Arms Co. v. GXE.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 102
N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1960).
15. Cleveland Press, p. 7, col. 4, Jan. 18, 1961.
16. Helena Rubenstein, Inc. v. Cincinnati Vitamin & Cosmetic Distributors Co., 167 N.E.2d
687 (Ohio C.P. 1960). See also discussion in ConstitutiondLaw section, p. 472 supra.

